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PUNISHING THE PARENT: CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL COMPLICITY IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES 
Jonathan Clough* 
“We are seeking to prevent . . . the perpetuation of a double standard 
under which most foreign corporations, as well as their home govern-
ments, operate. There is one set of standards—legal and moral—in 
domestic operations; but a completely different and much lower set of 
standards when these same entities are operating abroad, particularly 
in much poorer countries. This dichotomy is wrong, and the govern-
ments in the industrialized world have the means of preventing it: by 
applying extraterritorially many of the domestic and international 
standards that are adopted and enforced at home.”∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
nsuring the accountability of multinational corporations 
(“MNCs”)1 for their conduct in the developing world is one of the 
great legal challenges of our time. From humble beginnings, the legal 
fiction that is “the corporation” has evolved into a behemoth, central to 
the functioning of the world economy.2 It has been estimated that be-
tween twenty-nine3 and fifty-one4 of the one hundred largest economies 
are MNCs. In 2005, there were approximately 77,000 MNCs, with 
770,000 foreign affiliates, generating an estimated $4.5 trillion in value 
                                                                                                             
 *   Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University. 
       ∗∗ Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United 
States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to 
Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 145 (1996) 
(emphasis removed). 
 1. Multinational corporations (“MNCs”) are corporations that are incorporated in 
one country but operate in one or more other countries. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5–8 (2d ed. 2007). Other terms found in the 
literature include “transnational corporations” and “multinational enterprises.” Id. 
 2. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS—SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
3–39, 55–62 (1987) (providing a history of the evolution of the corporate form, and in 
particular of corporate groups). 
 3. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], World Investment Re-
port 2002: Multinational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, 90, 
UNCTAD/WIR/2002 (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs// 
wir2002_en.pdf (figure makes adjustments for the value-added nature of gross domestic 
product as opposed to sales). 
 4. Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate 
Power, at i, CORPORATE WATCH, Dec. 4, 2000, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf (figure is based on a comparison of sales with 
Gross Domestic Product). 
E 
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added, employing some 62 million workers and exporting goods and ser-
vices valued at more than $4 trillion.5 
Crucial to the success of these enterprises is the ability to incorporate 
in one country while seeking out opportunities in one or more other 
countries. Increasingly, these opportunities may be found in the develop-
ing world where resources are plentiful, labor is cheap, and regulation 
weak or non-existent. Such countries are also often notorious for human 
rights abuses in which MNCs may become involved. 
For example, a number of civil actions were brought against the giant 
U.S. energy company Unocol Corporation6 that alleged knowing in-
volvement in human rights abuses by the Burmese military.7 The allega-
tions arose from Unocal’s involvement in the production, transportation, 
and sale of gas in Burma, the plaintiffs being villagers in the area through 
which the gas pipeline passed.8 Security for the project was provided by 
the Burmese military and it was alleged that the plaintiffs were subjected 
to forced labor, as well as acts of murder, rape, and torture.9 Although 
disputed by Unocal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found “evidence 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact” that Unocal was aware 
that the project had hired the Burmese military to provide these ser-
                                                                                                             
 5. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, FDI from Developing and Transition 
Economies: Implications for Development, 5, UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006overview_en.pdf. 
 6. CHEVRONTEXACO, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, available at http://www.chevron.com/ 
Investors/FinancialInformation/AnnualReports/2004/financials/. Prior to its merger with 
ChevronTexaco (now Chevron), Unocal reported revenues of U.S.$8.2 billion, net earn-
ings of U.S.$1.2 billion and total assets of U.S.$13.1 billion. UNOCAL CORPORATION, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2004, available at http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/Unocal2004 
AnnualReport.pdf. 
 7. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, and remanded, 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 
F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal 
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 
1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The Union of Burma, otherwise known as Myanmar, will be re-
ferred to as Burma throughout this Article. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Burma, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn 
/35910.htm (last visited June 6, 2008) (The United States does not recognize the name 
Myanmar, as the country is called by the ruling junta, although the United Nations does 
use Myanmar.).  
 8. Doe v. Unocal Corp. 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, and remanded, 395 F.3d 932, 937–40 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g to en banc court 
granted, 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma 
v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335–37 (C.D. Cal 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 2d 1294, 1297–98 (C.D. Cal 2000). 
 9. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 939–40. 
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vices.10 John Haseman, a former military attaché at the U.S. embassy in 
Rangoon and consultant to Unocal reported that “egregious human rights 
violations have occurred, and are occurring now, in southern Burma . . . . 
Unocal, by seeming to have accepted [the Burmese Military]’s version of 
events, appears at best naïve and at worst a willing partner in the situa-
tion.”11 Although the District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Unocal, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals in respect of all but 
the torture claims.12 That decision was appealed to an eleven judge en 
banc court within the Ninth Circuit13 before the case was settled in De-
cember 2005.14 
In another example, Canada’s largest energy company, Talisman En-
ergy, Inc., was allegedly complicit in human rights abuses in the Sudan.15 
The plaintiffs claimed that “Talisman worked with the [Sudanese] 
[g]overnment to devise a plan of security for the oil fields and related 
facilities,”16 “Talisman hired its own military advisors to coordinate mili-
tary strategy with the [g]overnment,” and had “regular meetings with 
Sudan’s army intelligence unit and the Ministry of Energy and Mining . . 
. .”17 It was alleged that Talisman was aware that the government’s “pro-
tection” of oil operations, based on the joint Talisman and Sudanese- 
government strategy, entailed ethnic cleansing or genocide, the murder 
or enslavement of substantial numbers of civilians (including women and 
children), and the destruction of villages.18 
Such incidents have given rise to the term “corporate complicity,” 
which describes the alleged knowing involvement of corporations in hu-
man rights abuses committed by others. The key features that typically 
arise in such cases are: 
1. The defendant is a large, well-resourced transnational corporation. 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 938. 
 11. Id. at 942. 
 12. Id. at 962. 
 13. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 979.  
     14.  EarthRights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal, Mar. 21, 
2005, available at http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/final_settlement_reached_in_ 
doe_v._unocal.html. 
 15. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
299–301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 16. Id. at 300. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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2. The alleged human rights abuses occurred in a country (the ‘host ju-
risdiction’) other than the transnational corporation’s country of incor-
poration (the ‘home jurisdiction’). 
3. The host jurisdiction is unable and / or unwilling to investigate and 
prosecute the alleged abuses. 
4. The transnational corporation is alleged to be complicit in the human 
rights abuses either directly or, more commonly, indirectly through the 
interposition of subsidiaries or other intermediaries. . .19 
To date, efforts to render MNCs accountable for such conduct have 
fallen into one of three main categories. First, voluntary instruments such 
as the United Nations Global Compact20 and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises21 have encouraged corporations to observe and protect 
human rights in the conduct of their business.22 Second, civil actions 
have achieved limited success while also focusing attention on the is-
sue.23 They do, however, face considerable procedural obstacles and, to 
date, none have proceeded to judgment on the merits. Third, there have 
been some attempts to impose statutory obligations on corporations con-
ducting overseas operations to abide by minimum standards of conduct. 
While bills have been introduced in both the United States24 and Austra-
lia,25 the political obstacles to securing the passage of such legislation are 
considerable and, to date, neither has been passed.26 
                                                                                                             
 19. Jonathan Clough, Not-So-Innocents Abroad: Corporate Criminal Liability for 
Human Rights Abuses, 11(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5 (2005). 
 20. United Nations, Global Compact—What is the UN Global Compact?, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited June 2, 2008). 
 21. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. 80761 (rev. ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 22. Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have 
No Incentive to Define Human Rights 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 108–23 (2002). 
 23. See generally SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION (Colin Harvey ed., 2004); BETH STEPHENS ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 131–214 (2d ed. 2008); Michael Byers, Eng-
lish Courts and Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad: A Preliminary Assessment, in 
7 LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 241–49 
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000). 
 24. Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). 
 25. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill, 2000 (Austl.). 
 26. The H.R. 2782 was referred to the House Subcommittee on International Mone-
tary Policy and Trade on July 17, 2000. See WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, CENTER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (2000), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/1watch.cfm. The Australian bill was introduced 
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Until recently there has been relatively little discussion of the applica-
tion of domestic criminal law in this context.27 However, the nature of 
corporate involvement in human rights abuses, coupled with the diffi-
culty of securing prosecutions in the host jurisdiction, has focused atten-
tion on the potential liability of the parent corporation under the domestic 
laws of the home jurisdiction. The issue was specifically raised in a re-
cent survey of sixteen countries (“Surveyed Countries”) by the Fafo In-
stitute for Applied Studies in Norway (“Fafo Institute Survey”).28 The 
Surveyed Countries,29 representing a broad spectrum of both common 
law and civil law traditions, were asked to provide information as to their 
domestic laws relating to the accountability of MNCs.30 A specific rec-
ommendation arising out of the survey was that “consideration is re-
quired to explore how the components of complicity found in the differ-
ent national legal systems surveyed might be applied to business enti-
ties.”31 This Article attempts to address that question. 
                                                                                                             
after the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 was rejected by the Commonwealth Par-
liamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities. See 
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT STATUTORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND SECURITIES, 
REPORT ON THE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT BILL 2000, at 39 (2001), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-02/ 
corp_code/report/report.pdf. 
 27. Clough, supra note 19, at 3. See also Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: 
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 67 (2002); 
Craig Forcese, Deterring “Militarized Commerce”: The Prospect of Liability for “Pri-
vatized” Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 171, 174–84 (2000) (discussing 
several examples of corporate responsibility for human rights violations going un-
checked). See generally Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal 
Liability for Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327 
(2001). 
 28. ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: 
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES, Executive Summary (Fafo 
2006), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf [hereinafter FAFO SURVEY]. 
This survey followed an earlier pilot study of five countries. FAFO & INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE ACADEMY, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ASSESSING THE LIABILITY OF 
BUSINESS ENTITIES FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fafo 2003), avail-
able at http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/467.pdf. 
 29. The Surveyed Countries in the 2006 Fafo Survey are Argentina, Australia, Bel-
gium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
South Africa, Spain, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. FAFO 
SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13. 
 30. Id. at 9–12. 
 31. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 28. 
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Focusing on the common law jurisdictions of Australia,32 Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States,33 this Article analyzes the appli-
cation of domestic principles of complicity to extraterritorial conduct by 
corporations.34 The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an 
overview of principles of complicity under the domestic law of these ju-
risdictions. Part II considers the legal bases by which criminal conduct 
can be attributed to a corporation, particularly where the defendant forms 
part of a corporate group. As the alleged abuses will have occurred out-
side the home jurisdiction, Part III discusses principles of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. Part IV provides two examples of how legislative 
provisions may be drafted in order to impose extraterritorial criminal 
liability on corporations. The Article concludes that while the imposition 
of such liability is theoretically possible, whether it is a practical option 
is questionable. Nonetheless, it is argued that the underlying rationales 
found in the criminal law provide ample justification for the enactment 
of specific criminal statutes targeting corporate complicity in terms that 
are appropriate for a corporate defendant. Models for such legislation 
already exist both in the United States and elsewhere, providing an ap-
propriate and potentially more effective means of prosecuting the parent 
corporation for its complicity in human rights abuses by others. 
Although the focus of this Article is on the liability of the parent corpo-
ration in the home jurisdiction, this is not to dismiss the importance of 
pursuing the perpetrators in the host country.35 It simply recognizes that 
there are many practical difficulties in doing so. Given that the ultimate 
beneficiary of these enterprises is the parent, it is both logical and rea-
sonable to seek means to render such corporations accountable for their 
conduct. This Article explores one way in which that may be achieved 
via criminal prosecution for complicity. 
                                                                                                             
 32. With respect to Australia, the focus will be on the relevant federal law, the Crimi-
nal Code Act 1995 (Austl.). 
 33. With respect to the United States, references in this Article will be made to rele-
vant federal provisions and also the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code. 
 34. See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); 
JOSEPH, supra note 23. Because of its specific focus, this Article does not address broader 
questions relating to the accountability of MNCs. 
 35. See Damian Betz, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible for Human 
Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations: An Argument 
Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating Corporate Behav-
ior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 163, 202–05 (2002). 
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I. PRINCIPLES OF COMPLICITY 
Allegations against corporations do not typically allege that the corpo-
ration committed the abuses in its own right. Rather, the corporation is 
said to have provided support to those who actually committed the 
abuses, either by encouraging them and/or by providing some form of 
assistance. Such conduct fits neatly within the general concept of crimi-
nal complicity, and this terminology has been regularly applied in this 
context.36 
Complicity is a well-established basis for criminal liability, tracing its 
common law roots back to at least the fourteenth century,37 with similar 
principles also evolving in civil law countries.38 It is almost universally 
recognized as a legitimate basis for criminal liability, with all of the Sur-
veyed Countries recognizing complicity as an offense under their domes-
tic law.39 Principles of complicity are also recognized in international 
law,40 being found in article 25(3) of the Rome Statute41 and accepted by 
the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugo-
slavia.42 
The essence of complicity is easily stated; the accomplice is punished 
because of his or her knowing involvement in the crime of another. It is 
well established that these principles may also be applied to a corpora-
tion.43 While easily stated, liability for complicity presents significant 
conceptual challenges even when applied domestically. Courts have 
struggled to appropriately define the scope of liability, resulting in an 
area of the law that “betrays the worst features of the common law: what 
                                                                                                             
 36. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in 
Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2001). Although be-
yond the scope of this Article, the related principles of conspiracy and incitement may 
also be relevant in this context. 
 37. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 38. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 345. 
 39. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 16. 
 40. Although note conflicting U.S. authority as to whether aiding and abetting forms 
part of the “law of nations” for the purposes of the Alien Tort Claims Act. See In re 
South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Pres-
byterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320–24 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 42. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 6.3.2, 7.8 
(Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT 95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 198, 207 
(Dec. 10, 1998); FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 20. 
 43. John Henshall (Quarries), Ltd. v. Harvey, [1965] 2 Q.B. 233, 241 (U.K.); Nat’l 
Coal Bd. v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11 (U.K.); R v. Robert Millar (Contractors), Ltd., 
[1970] 2 Q.B. 54 (U.K.). 
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some would regard as flexibility appears here as a succession of oppor-
tunistic decisions by the courts, often extending the law, and resulting in 
a body of jurisprudence that has little coherence.”44 These complexities 
are magnified when different jurisdictions are considered, with each 
country adopting different approaches to the same challenges. Although 
a detailed analysis of principles of complicity is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is possible to summarize the key features that, with some 
variation, are similar in each jurisdiction. 
A. The Need for a Principal Offender 
In contrast to inchoate offenses such as conspiracy and incitement, li-
ability for complicity is derivative. That is, the liability of the accessory 
is predicated on the commission of an offense (the “principal offense”) 
by a “principal offender” or “principal.”45 Therefore, being an “acces-
sory” is not an offense in its own right; the accused is a party to the prin-
cipal offense and is tried and sentenced as a principal offender. Conse-
quently, if there is no principal offense, there can be no liability for com-
plicity. The trier of fact must therefore be satisfied, on the criminal stan-
dard, that the principal offense has been committed. 
It might seem that this requirement would present a significant obsta-
cle, particularly if the principal offense is alleged to have occurred in 
another jurisdiction where there may be no prosecution of the principal 
offender. However, it is not necessary for the alleged principal offender 
to have been convicted of the principal offense. An accused may be 
guilty of complicity even where a principal offender has not been identi-
fied. So long as the trier of fact is satisfied that the principal offense was 
committed by some person, and is satisfied of the accused’s involvement 
in that offense, then he or she may be liable as an accessory.46 
In some circumstances, there will be no principal offense because the 
principal offender is incapable of committing an offense. For example, 
he or she may be a child below the age of criminal responsibility or an 
adult who does not possess the necessary mens rea. Although a strict ap-
plication of accessorial principles would deny liability as there is no 
                                                                                                             
 44. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 440 (5th ed. 2006). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(1) (2007) (Austl.); Crimi-
nal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 21(1)(a) (1985); Accessories and Abettors Act, 
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng.); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951); MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.06(1) (2001). 
 46. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(5) (2007) (Austl.); King v. R (1986) 161 C.L.R. 
423, 433–36 (Austl.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7) (2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 689 (4th ed. 2003). 
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principal offense, the defendant may be liable under the doctrine of inno-
cent agency.47 
Where an act, which would be a crime if done by A, is caused by A to 
be done by B, and B does not commit a crime by doing so, the law may 
regard A as having acted by an innocent agent and as being guilty of the 
crime as a principal offender.48 
In such cases, the defendant is not actually liable as an accessory. 
Rather, he or she is regarded as having committed the principal offense 
through the agency of the innocent agent. 
B. The Actus Reus of Complicity 
For a relatively straightforward concept, the law of complicity has de-
veloped terminology of surprising complexity. At common law, an ac-
cessory was referred to either as a principal in the second degree or as an 
accessory before the fact, depending on whether or not the accused was 
present during the commission of the principal offense. The terminology 
used to describe the conduct of an accessory was equally varied: aiding, 
abetting, comforting, concurring, approbating, encouraging, consenting, 
assenting, countenancing, counseling or procuring.49 Today, the most 
common formulation is to say that the accused will be liable as an acces-
sory if he or she “aids, abets, counsels or procures” the commission of 
the principal offense.50 Similar terminology has been adopted in all of the 
Surveyed Countries.51 
Although these words have a specific meaning, but they are all “in-
stances of one general idea, that the person charged . . . is in some way 
linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and is 
by his words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering 
                                                                                                             
 47. Osland v. R (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 347–48 (Austl.). A more correct term is 
“non-responsible” agent. Id.  
 48. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.3 (2007) 
(Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 23.1 (1985); R v. Demirian [1989] 
V.R. 97 (Austl.); R v. Cogan, [1976] Q.B. 217 (U.K.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) 
(2001). 
 49. R v. Russell [1959] V.R. 59, 66–67 (Austl.). See also LEFAVE, supra note 46, at 
671. 
 50. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(1) (2007) (Austl.); 
Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng.). In Canada, “coun-
sel” is defined to include “procure, solicit or incite.” Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 
ch. C-46, § 22.3 (1985). The Model Penal Code refers only to “aids” and “solicits.” 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(i)(ii) (2001). The equivalent terms in civil law countries 
are “l’aide et l’assistance, la fourniture des moyens.” Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 
345. 
 51. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 18. 
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more likely, such commission.”52 They are not, however, mutually exclu-
sive because the conduct of the accused may fall within more than one 
category. For example, it has been suggested that an act of abetting will 
usually be implicit in, or associated with, an act of aiding.53 
Traditionally, the phrase aiding and abetting was used when the ac-
cused was present at the commission of the principal offense, whereas 
“counselling and procuring” described those situations in which the ac-
cused was absent.54 Corporate complicity would therefore typically in-
volve counseling and procuring as assistance and/or encouragement is 
provided prior to the commission of the offense. In any event, the dis-
tinction has now been removed in most jurisdictions and even in Eng-
land, where this distinction is retained, it appears to have little practical 
consequence.55 The same is true of the conflict between Australian and 
U.K. authority on whether the words “aiding and abetting, counseling 
and procuring” should be given their ordinary56 or their common law 
meaning.57 In practical terms, even at common law the words are given 
what would generally be regarded as their ordinary meanings. 
For example, aiding is given its natural meaning of “give support to, . . 
. help, assist.”58 Typical acts of aiding include providing materials or 
other physical support, providing advice, or acting as a lookout. The es-
sential feature of abetting is that the accused was present during the 
commission of the principal offense and encouraged the commission of 
that offense.59 Encouragement may be express or implied, and in some 
cases the mere presence of the accused may provide encouragement to 
the principal offender.60 
Similarly, counseling involves advice or encouragement prior to the 
commission of the offense, and has been interpreted as meaning “urged 
or advised,”61 or to “advise” or “solicit.”62 Typical examples of counsel-
ing include providing advice on the commission of the offense, for ex-
                                                                                                             
 52. R v. Russell [1933] V.R. 59, 67 (Austl.) (cited with approval in Giorgianni v. R 
(1985) 156 C.L.R. 473, 493). 
 53. ASHWORTH, supra note 44, at 414. 
 54. Ferguson v. Weaving, [1951] 1 K.B. 814, 818–19 (U.K.). 
 55. ASHWORTH, supra note 44, at 414. 
 56. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.). 
 57. Giorgianni v. R (1985) 156 C.L.R. 473, 492 (Austl.). 
 58. R v. Beck (1990) 43 A. Crim. R. 135, 143 (Austl.); R v. Greyeyes, [1997] 2 
S.C.R. 825, 837 (Can.). 
 59. R v. Russell (1933) V.R. 59, 67 (Austl.); R v. Salajko, [1970] 1 O.R. 824, 826 
(Can.); Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 467 (K.B.) (U.K.). 
 60. R v. Coney, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 534 (U.K.). 
 61. Stuart v. R (1974) 134 C.L.R. 426, 445 (Austl.). 
 62. R v. Calhaem, [1985] 1 Q.B. 808, 813 (U.K.). 
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ample by providing directions or inside knowledge, or simply by provid-
ing encouragement. 
Procuring refers to conduct of the accused that goes beyond merely en-
couraging the commission of the principal offense and actually causes or 
brings about its commission.63 An example of such conduct is when the 
accused offers money for the offense to be committed. “To procure 
means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by setting out to 
see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that hap-
pening.”64 It is the only form of complicity that requires proof of a causal 
connection between the accessory’s conduct and the commission of the 
principal offense. In other cases, it is sufficient if the conduct of the ac-
cused can be described as assisting or encouraging the commission of 
that offense, even though it did not cause its commission, and even if 
ultimately it made no material difference to the outcome.65 
In light of the above, and despite all the variation in terminology, com-
plicity essentially consists of providing assistance and/or encouragement 
to the principal offender. Such terms are broad enough to encompass 
typical examples of what, in the corporate context, has been described as 
direct complicity; that is, when a company knowingly assists in a human 
rights violation.66 Examples include knowingly assisting in the forced 
relocation of peoples in circumstances related to business activity67 or 
providing financial or material support to security forces known to en-
gage in human rights abuses.68 Such conduct not only involves the provi-
sion of assistance to the principal offender, but may also constitute en-
couragement of the principal offense. In circumstances in which a corpo-
ration has employed security forces who then commit human rights 
abuses, it may even be said that the corporation has procured the com-
mission of the principal offense by paying for and thereby causing its 
commission. 
In other cases, the alleged complicity may be the failure of the accused 
to intervene and prevent the principal offense; that is, turning a blind eye. 
In the corporate context, the term silent complicity has been used to de-
scribe those situations in which the corporation assists or encourages the 
                                                                                                             
 63. R v. Beck, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 22, 27–28 (U.K.). 
 64. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.). See 
also LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 674. 
 65. THE LAW COMMISSION, PARTICIPATING IN CRIME, Law Com No. 305, ¶¶ 2.32–2.33 
(2007). See also Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(2)(a) (2007) (Austl.). 
 66. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, 341–42. 
 67. Id. at 342. 
 68. Forcese, supra note 27, at 185 (discussing examples of “financial complicity” and 
“material complicity”). 
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human rights violation through its inaction.69 An example of such silent 
complicity is when a corporation is aware of human rights abuses but 
fails to raise any objection. In general, mere acquiescence in or assent to 
the principal offense is not sufficient to constitute complicity unless it 
can be said to encourage or assist the principal offense.70 However, si-
lence or inaction may constitute complicity if, for example, that silence is 
taken by the principal offender to constitute tacit approval and the ac-
cused remains silent knowing this to be the case.71 Consequently, silent 
complicity could arise when a parent corporation is aware of a violation 
by a subsidiary or an independent contractor, which in turn is aware of 
the parent’s knowledge and is encouraged by the parent’s inaction. It is 
also the case that when the defendant is under a legal duty to act, failure 
to discharge that duty may constitute complicity.72 There is also some 
limited authority that the failure of an employer to prevent an employee 
from committing an offense may constitute complicity.73 
Professor Clapham also refers to a third category of complicity, known 
as beneficial or indirect complicity, in which a corporation benefits di-
rectly from human rights abuses committed by someone else. For exam-
ple, the company may benefit from the suppression of peaceful protest 
against its business activities or the use of repressive measures while 
guarding company facilities.74 In the absence of conduct more akin to 
direct or silent complicity, the mere fact of benefiting from a human 
rights violation is unlikely to constitute complicity under domestic 
criminal law. Such circumstances are more commonly addressed by spe-
cific legislation that prevents a person benefiting from the proceeds of 
crime. 
C. The Mens Rea for Complicity 
Although the range of conduct that may amount to complicity is broad, 
the mens rea element provides a significant limitation on its scope. Each 
jurisdiction requires that the accused intended to assist or encourage the 
                                                                                                             
 69. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, 341–42. 
 70. R v. Phan (2001) 53 N.S.W.L.R. 480, 487 (Austl.). See also Wilcox v. Jeffery, 
[1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 466 (K.B.) (U.K.); LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 672–73. 
 71. R v. Coney, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 540 (U.K.). For a discussion of similar con-
cepts in international law, see Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 347–49. 
 72. THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 65, ¶ 2.26. 
 73. See generally R v. Gaunt, [2004] 2 Crim. App. 194 (U.K.); R v J.F. Alford 
Transp. Ltd., [1997] 2 Crim. App. 326 (U.K.). 
 74. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 347. 
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commission of the principal offense.75 It is not enough that he or she did 
so recklessly or unwittingly. Some jurisdictions also require that the de-
fendant must “know the essential matters which constitute the principal 
offense.”76 This does not mean that the accused must have been aware 
that the conduct amounted to a criminal offense, as such an interpretation 
would allow an accused to argue ignorance of the law as a defense.77 Nor 
is it necessary to prove that the defendant knew the precise details of the 
principal offense, such as time and place. It is sufficient that the accused 
had knowledge of the principal offender’s intention to commit a crime of 
the type that was in fact committed.78 
The requirement of actual knowledge may be a significant impediment 
to prosecution for complicity in human rights abuses. For example, 
Dutch national Frans van Anraat was prosecuted for complicity in Sad-
dam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons because he allegedly supplied 
the necessary chemicals during the 1980s.79 He was acquitted of this 
charge on the basis that he did not know the use to which the chemicals 
would be put.80 Similarly, Gus Van Kouwenhoven was charged with 
complicity in the war crimes of former Liberian President Charles Tay-
lor.81 Van Kouwenhoven operated a timber trading company in close 
association with the former president, but was acquitted of complicity 
charges due to lack of evidence that he had knowledge of the war 
crimes.82 
Because of these difficulties, some jurisdictions adopt a lesser mens 
rea. For example, in Germany and the Netherlands, it is sufficient that 
the defendant was aware of the conduct and showed “indifference toward 
or acceptance of the chance that a proscribed result might occur.”83 This 
                                                                                                             
 75. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006); Giorgianni v. R (1985) 
156 C.L.R. 473, 487–88 (Austl.); R v. Greyeyes, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825, 842 (Can.). See 
also Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abet-
tor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (discussion of 
the mens rea requirement in the United States). 
 76. Giorgianni, 156 C.L.R. at 487–88; Johnson v. Youden, [1950] 1 K.B. 544, 546 
(U.K.). See generally United States v. Peoni, 100 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). See also 
Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(3)(a) (2007) (Austl.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) 
(2001); LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 675–83. The requirement of knowledge has also been 
applied by the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 20. 
 77. Johnson, 1 K.B. at 546. 
 78. See generally R v. Bainbridge, [1960] 1 Q.B. 129 (U.K.). 
 79. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 19 n.17. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 20. 
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is not generally the case in common law countries, although in the 
United Kingdom it has been said that there are four different interpreta-
tions of the mens rea for complicity that require less than actual knowl-
edge.84 
Some concern has also been expressed that there must be a “shared in-
tention” between the accomplice and the principal offender, and that this 
may be difficult to apply in the context of corporate complicity as the 
two actors may have different motivations for the conduct.85 Although in 
most cases the accessory will share the principal offender’s intention that 
the principal offense be committed, this is not, however, an essential re-
quirement of secondary liability. That is, there is no need to show that 
the accessory and principal offender were in agreement or shared a 
common purpose.86 
Further, it is important to remember the crucial distinction between in-
tention and motive. Complicity requires that the accomplice intentionally 
assisted the commission of the principal offense. While the accomplice’s 
motive may be evidence of that intention, it is not an element of the of-
fense. For example, security forces may commit murder because of gov-
ernment policy and/or racial hatred. A corporation that is complicit in 
such conduct is still liable as an accessory notwithstanding that it was 
motivated by business interests. Nor does it matter that the accomplice 
did not wish the principal offense to be committed. An accomplice will 
still be liable whether indifferent or horrified about what is to happen.87 
One circumstance in which a lesser standard of mens rea is required is 
where two or more people act in concert pursuant to a common purpose 
or joint enterprise to commit an offense. Where the agreed offense is ac-
tually committed, each party to the joint criminal enterprise is liable as a 
principal offender, irrespective of the actual role they played in its com-
mission. More significantly, where the offense committed is different 
from that intended by the group, each party will be liable if the offense 
actually committed was a foreseeable consequence of the common pur-
                                                                                                             
 84. THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 65, ¶ 2.65. The tests are:  
(1) belief that P might commit the conduct element; (2) foresight of the risk of 
a strong possibility that P will commit it; (3) contemplation of the risk of a real 
possibility that P will commit it; and (4) foresight that it is likely that P will 
commit it. 
Id. 
 85. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 18–19. 
 86. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.). 
 87. Nat’l Coal Bd. v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, 23 (U.K.) (cited with approval in 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 539 (Sept. 2, 
1998)); Dir. of Public Prosecutions for N. Ir. v. Lynch, [1975] 1 A.C. 653, 678 (H.L.). 
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pose. In some jurisdictions, the level of foresight required is low, requir-
ing only that the defendant foresaw the offense actually committed was a 
possible consequence of the joint enterprise.88 In others, such as the 
United States, the acts of the principal offender must have been a “natu-
ral and probable consequence” of the criminal scheme the accomplice 
encouraged or aided.89 Although recognized in international law,90 the 
doctrine is not universally adopted. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Having considered the application of general principles of complicity 
in the context of human rights abuses, it is necessary to consider how 
those principles apply when the defendant is a corporation.91 Corporate 
criminal liability is a relatively recent phenomenon, having evolved pri-
marily in nineteenth century Anglo-American law as a response to the 
increasing role of corporations during the industrial revolution.92 Al-
though well established in many common law countries, civil law juris-
dictions have generally been slower to recognize corporations as suitable 
subjects for criminal prosecution.93 More commonly, these jurisdictions 
rely upon civil or administrative penalties, although in some cases such 
administrative penalties are much closer in form to criminal penalties.94 
                                                                                                             
 88. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(3)(b) (2007) (Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada, 
R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 21(2), 22(2) (1985); McAuliffe & McAuliffe v. R (1995) 183 C.L.R. 
108, 113–14 (Austl.); R v. Powell, [1999] 1 A.C. 1, 6–7 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 89. LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 687. 
 90. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Law, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 75, 102–03 (2005). 
 91. The focus of this Article is on the liability of corporations as opposed to unincor-
porated entities which, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, are not sub-
ject to criminal liability in their own right. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 969 (2d ed. 1983). The Canadian Criminal Code defines “organization” 
extremely broadly, and unincorporated entities fall within this definition. Criminal Code 
of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 2 (1985). 
 92. For a history of corporate criminal liability see L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW, 15–42 (1969). 
 93. For a comparative perspective, see generally XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS (Hans de Doelder & 
Klauss Tiedemann eds., 1996). 
 94. THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CORPORATE KILLING 112–13 (2005) (Ir.); James 
Gobert & Emilia Mugnai, Coping with Corporate Criminality—Some Lessons from Italy, 
CRIM. L. REV. 619, 624 (2002). 
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Nonetheless, eleven of the sixteen Surveyed Countries apply criminal 
liability to legal persons, including corporations.95 These countries repre-
sent a range of legal traditions, suggesting that there is indeed growing 
acceptance of corporate criminal liability. Although corporations are not 
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), this 
was apparently a result of procedural and definitional problems rather 
than a challenge to the “conceptual assumption that legal persons are 
bound by international criminal law.”96 
While early authority suggested that a company could not be indicted 
for manslaughter or any offense of violence,97 the weight of authority is 
now to the effect that a corporation can commit any offense except those 
which, by their nature, can only be committed by an individual.98 How-
ever, the individualistic nature of the criminal law, with its emphasis on 
guilty acts and guilty minds, presents particular challenges for the impo-
sition of corporate criminal liability. A corporation, as a legal fiction, 
cannot act in its own right; it can only act through human agents. Ac-
cordingly, each jurisdiction has developed ways to render corporations 
liable for the actions of individuals. 
For example, U.S. federal courts apply principles of vicarious liability, 
including for those offenses that require proof of mens rea.99 Other juris-
dictions have adopted a modified form of vicarious liability whereby the 
corporation will only be liable when the relevant conduct was engaged in 
by a person within the company of sufficient seniority to be regarded as 
                                                                                                             
 95. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13. Among the countries surveyed, this includes: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Af-
rica, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The five countries that do not permit 
legal persons to be prosecuted for criminal offenses are: Argentina, Germany, Indonesia, 
Spain, and the Ukraine. Id. 
 96. Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal 
Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Crimi-
nal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 23, at 139, 191. 
 97. People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 106–09 (N.Y. 1909); R v. 
Cory Bros. & Co. Ltd., [1927] 1 K.B. 810, 815–17 (U.K.); R v. Great N. of Engl. Ry. 
Co., [1846] 9 Q.B. 315, 326, 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B.). The question was left 
open by the Canadian Supreme Court in Union Colliery Co. v. R, [1900] 31 S.C.R. 81, 
88–90 (Can.). 
 98. THE LAW COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES—CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, Working Paper No. 44, 23 (1972).  
 99. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 
494–95 (1909); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 
1962). See generally KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 18–32 
(4th ed. 2006). 
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the “directing mind and will” of the company.100 Some jurisdictions, 
most notably Australia and Canada, have enacted comprehensive provi-
sions specifically addressing the criminal liability of corporations.101 Add 
to these general models of liability a raft of specific statutory provisions 
and the challenge is not so much devising a model of corporate criminal 
liability, but choosing the most appropriate one. 
It is not proposed to discuss the merits of the various models of corpo-
rate criminal liability.102 Less commonly analyzed, and representing a 
particular challenge in the context of MNCs, is the question of how to 
render a parent corporation liable for the conduct of its subsidiaries. The 
analysis has so far proceeded on the simple model of a corporation di-
rectly involved in the assistance or encouragement of the conduct in the 
host jurisdiction. In reality, this is rarely the case because the conduct of 
the parent is carried out through the intermediary of a subsidiary or sub-
sidiaries. For example, Unocal conducted its operations in Burma 
through wholly owned subsidiaries,103 while Talisman conducted its op-
erations in the Sudan through a consortium of oil companies called the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, Ltd. (“GNPOC”).104 
The rationale for interposing subsidiaries is easily understood; it mini-
mizes risk and insulates the parent. Because of the principle of separate 
corporate identity, the subsidiary or related company is treated as a sepa-
rate legal entity.105 Consequently, the parent will generally not be liable 
for the conduct of the subsidiary, despite the “commercial reality that 
every holding company has the potential and, more often than not, in fact 
does, exercise complete control over a subsidiary.”106 Further insulation 
of the parent is provided by the principle of limited liability, whereby the 
                                                                                                             
 100. Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153, 171 (H.L.) (U.K.). See 
also Hamilton v. Whitehead (1988) 166 C.L.R. 121, 127 (Tesco as applied in Australia); 
Can. Dredge & Dock Co. v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, 691–96. 
 101. Criminal Code Act, 1995, pt. 2.5 (2007) (Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada, 
R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 22.1–22.2 (1985). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (2001). 
 102. See generally JONATHAN CLOUGH & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF 
CORPORATIONS 64–182 (2002); JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING 
CORPORATE CRIME 78–178 (2003). 
 103. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 
395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 104. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 105. Adams v. Cape Indus., PLC, (1991) Ch. 433, 536 (U.K.). 
 106. Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 549, 577 (Austl.). The situa-
tion is otherwise where the relevant conduct is carried out by an unincorporated division 
of an incorporated entity. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 
1960). 
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liability of shareholders, including corporate shareholders, is limited to 
the unpaid amount of their investment. The extension of this principle, 
designed to protect investors in the enterprise, to the enterprise itself is 
one of the most significant factors in the success of MNCs because it 
allows risk to be transferred to the (often undercapitalized) subsidiary.107 
Thus, in the multi-tiered corporate group, with its first-tier, second-tier, 
and even third-tier subsidiaries, traditional entity law provides multiple 
layers of limited liability, with each upper-tier company insulated from 
liability for its lower-tier subsidiaries. Four, or even five, layers of lim-
ited liability in complex multinational groups are not uncommon.108 
While complex corporate structures and the use of subsidiaries is now 
standard practice in the corporate world, the challenges they present are 
not new. Nor are they limited to the sphere of human rights abuses. Par-
ticularly in the United States, ever since limited liability was extended to 
corporate groups, courts have struggled to articulate a principled basis on 
which to mitigate its more extreme consequences by rendering the parent 
liable for the conduct of the subsidiary.109 This has involved courts ap-
plying principles of agency liability as well as so-called enterprise liabil-
ity whereby the courts will pierce the corporate veil and impose liability 
on the parent for the conduct of the group.110 “This theory recognizes that 
when a parent and its subsidiary are part of an economically integrated 
enterprise, there is, in effect, one corporate actor and consequently ‘all 
components comprising the integrated group should accordingly be li-
able.’”111 
While extensive, this body of jurisprudence is of little assistance. First, 
even in the United States, there are “hundreds of decisions that are irrec-
oncilable and not entirely comprehensible,”112 with principles that have 
been described as a “legal quagmire.”113 Second, there is limited author-
ity for their application in the context of criminal liability, a rare example 
being the prosecution of Exxon Corporation for the grounding of the 
                                                                                                             
 107. PHILLIP E. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 
58–60 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993). 
 108. Id. at 59. 
 109. See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 2. 
 110. See BLUMBERG, supra note 2,  at pp. 105–36. 
 111. Robert Iraola, Criminal Liability of a Parent Company for the Conduct of its Sub-
sidiary: The Spillover of the Exxon Valdez, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 9 (1995) (citing PHILLIP 
I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY 
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION 967 (1983)). 
 112. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 86–87. 
 113. United States v. John-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986). 
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Exxon Valdez oil tanker.114 In denying Exxon’s motion to dismiss, the 
District Court apparently accepted both agency and enterprise theory as 
grounds of Exxon Corporation’s liability for the conduct of its subsidi-
ary.115 This decision is, however, of little precedential value as the corpo-
rations ultimately entered into a plea agreement for $150 million, which 
was subsequently reduced to a $25 million fine and $100 million in resti-
tution.116 Third, outside the United States, courts are more inclined to 
adhere to the principle of separate corporate personality, with no clear 
principle indicating the circumstances in which a court will be prepared 
to lift the corporate veil in civil, let alone criminal, cases.117 
Although of limited general application, such cases do serve to focus 
attention on the concept of control as a means of rendering the parent 
liable for the group.118 Given the variety of corporate structures, whether 
a corporation controls another can be a complex question. Clearly there 
must be something beyond the level of control inherent in the parent-
subsidiary relationship. But in what circumstances should a group of 
companies be regarded as an integrated entity rather than separate busi-
nesses? While the answer is obviously dependent on the circumstances, 
“[w]hat should be critical to the analysis should be the reality of the rela-
tionship between parent and subsidiary and not the technical legal form 
that it takes.”119 Relevant factors include the level of control actually ex-
ercised by the parent over the subsidiary, the extent to which the compa-
nies are economically integrated, the level of financial and administrative 
interdependence, overlapping employment structures, and a common 
group persona.120 
                                                                                                             
 114. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965); 
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While the common law is reluctant to look behind notions of separate 
corporate identity and limited liability, it must be remembered that these 
are simply legal fictions and are subject to legislative intervention. One 
way in which this may be done is by imposing liability in functional 
terms. By imposing liability upon corporations that “control” other cor-
porations, the controlling corporation may then be made liable for the 
conduct of the group.121 For example, under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967,122 when an employer controls a corporation 
incorporated in a foreign country, any prohibited practice by that corpo-
ration is presumed to be the conduct of the employer.123 The determina-
tion of whether an employer controls a corporation is based upon four 
factors: “the interrelation of operations, common management, central-
ized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial con-
trol, of the employer and the corporation.”124 
Similarly, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 defines a “bank 
holding company” to mean “any company which has control over any 
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company 
by virtue” of this Act.125 Under section 1841(a)(2), any company has 
control over a bank or company if: 
(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more 
other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or 
more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company; 
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of 
the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or 
(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that 
the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence 
over the management or policies of the bank or company.126 
An alternative way of rendering the parent liable for the conduct of the 
group would be to impose an obligation on the parent corporation to en-
sure that it takes reasonable steps to ensure that neither it, nor any of its 
subsidiaries are engaged in specified offenses, irrespective of where they 
                                                                                                             
 121. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 107–16. In some cases, courts have interpreted 
statutory provisions as imposing group liability in order to ensure that legislative inten-
tion was not frustrated. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (discussing 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)). 
 122. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (2006). 
 123. Id. § 623(h)(1). 
 124. Id. § 623(h)(3). 
 125. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006). 
 126. Id. §1841(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
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occur.127 The advantage of such an obligation is that it avoids the need 
for attribution and focuses on the failure of the corporation itself: 
Where a statutory duty to do something is imposed on a particular per-
son . . . and he does not do it, he commits the actus reus of an offence. . 
. . but this is not a case of vicarious liability. If the employer is held li-
able, it is because he personally has failed to do what the law requires 
him to do and he is personally not vicariously liable. There is no need 
to find someone—in the case of a company, the brains and not merely 
the hands—for whose act the person with the duty be held liable.128 
Corporate liability for a failure to act is a well-established basis of li-
ability, particularly in the area of workplace safety, where there is a duty 
to ensure a safe workplace. A similar concept is apparently found in It-
aly, where a corporation can be made liable for “structural negligence;” 
that is, failing to ensure that suitable systems were in place to prevent an 
the commission of an offense.129 In the context of complicity, the Model 
Penal Code provides that a defendant will be liable as an accomplice if, 
“having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, [he or she] 
fails to make proper effort so to do . . . with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating the commission of the offense.”130 
By focusing on what the corporation failed to do, liability for omis-
sions allows a broad range of factors to be taken into account, allowing 
an assessment of the “culture” of the organization. Any danger that the 
provision is overbroad can be minimized by providing for an appropriate 
fault element, such as criminal negligence, or by allowing a due dili-
gence defense. In the context of MNCs, liability for the failure resides 
with the parent itself, rather than in the complex web of its subsidiaries. 
However, even if corporate liability may be imposed in enterprise terms, 
rendering the company liable for the conduct of those entities that it con-
trols, an additional challenge remains. In what circumstances can the 
criminal law apply extraterritorially? 
                                                                                                             
 127. Olivier De Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the 
Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations 44–45 (Catholic Law Sch. 
& Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Background Paper, Nov. 3, 2006), 
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-
re-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf. 
 128. John Smith, Case Commentary, Health and Safety at Work: R v. British Steel, 
PLC, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 655. See also LAW COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LAW: INVOLUNTARY 
MANSLAUGHTER, Consultation Paper No. 135, 129 (1994). 
 129. Gobert & Mugnai, supra note 94, at 626. 
 130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (2001). 
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III. PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
There is a general presumption that criminal laws are local in operation 
and apply only in the sovereign territory of the state that enacted the 
law.131 This territorial principle is almost universally recognized and is 
the most common basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.132 Al-
though intended to limit the reach of criminal laws, the principle of terri-
toriality may nonetheless encompass extraterritorial conduct in some 
cases. In particular, the doctrine of ubiquity allows a state to exert juris-
diction over an offense when only part of the offense was committed 
within the jurisdiction.133 This is particularly relevant in the context of 
complicity, where the act of complicity may occur in the home jurisdic-
tion, even though the principal offense occurred in the host jurisdiction. 
Although at common law the application of this doctrine in such cases 
was limited,134 this position may of course be altered by clear legislative 
intention. For example, under section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971, it is an offense for a person to assist in or induce the commission in 
any place outside the United Kingdom an offense punishable under the 
provisions of a corresponding law in force in that place.135 It is therefore 
possible for an appropriately drafted statute to impose liability on a par-
ent corporation for complicity with respect to conduct occurring within 
the home jurisdiction, even though the principal offense is intended to be 
committed in the host jurisdiction. This doctrine has particular signifi-
cance in the context of corporate liability as corporate offenders, unlike 
individuals, can be in more than one place at one time. Unless the corpo-
ration’s operations are completely restricted to the host jurisdiction, it is 
likely that at least some of the relevant conduct will have occurred in the 
home jurisdiction. For example, although the provision of assistance may 
have occurred primarily in the host jurisdiction, executive approval may 
have been given in the home jurisdiction. It may therefore be argued that 
                                                                                                             
 131. Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 561 (U.K.). See generally 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); 
R v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 805–12 (Can.). 
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. c (1987); DAVID 
LANHAM, CROSS-BORDER CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1997); Council of Europe: European Com-
mittee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 3 CRIM. L.F. 441, 446 
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 133. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 446–47, 462. 
 134. MICHAEL HIRST, JURISDICTION AND THE AMBIT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 129 (An-
drew Ashworth ed., 2003). 
 135. Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971, 1971, § 20, sched. 1 (Eng.). See also Crimes Act 
1958, § 181 (1958) (Vict.). 
2008] PUNISHING THE PARENT 921 
the home jurisdiction may assert jurisdiction as part of the offending 
conduct occurred within its jurisdiction. 
In any event, the enactment of extraterritorial laws in this context is 
clearly justified on two bases. The first is the principle of universal juris-
diction, which recognizes the right of any country to exercise jurisdiction 
over a defendant with respect to “universal crimes” such as piracy, geno-
cide, and war crimes.136 Jurisdiction may be exercised irrespective of the 
nationality of the defendant or the locus of the offense, with such sweep-
ing jurisdiction being justified by the egregious nature of the conduct and 
the need to limit the availability of safe havens for those accused of such 
crimes.137 A number of the Surveyed Countries impose universal juris-
diction with respect to crimes under the Rome Statute.138 However, given 
the need for the defendant to have some presence in the jurisdiction in 
order to be prosecuted, it is argued that the second basis of jurisdiction, 
the nationality or active personality, provides a more sound rationale for 
extraterritoriality in the context of corporate defendants. 
This second principle recognizes that a state may extend the applica-
tion of its criminal laws to its own nationals wherever they may be lo-
cated. It is widely recognized as a basis of extraterritorial criminal laws 
and is adopted by a number of the Surveyed Countries with respect to 
Rome Statute crimes committed by their nationals.139 For example, the 
International Criminal Court Act of 2001 (U.K.) imposes liability for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and applies extrater-
ritorially to acts committed outside the jurisdiction by U.K. nationals or 
residents.140 
There are essentially two rationales for a country’s imposition of extra-
territorial criminal liability on its own nationals. First, it is a means for 
                                                                                                             
 136. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 453. See also LANHAM, 
supra note 132, at 37–38. 
 137. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 453. 
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 140. International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 51 (2001) (U.K.). Liability also 
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states to subject “their own nationals to certain national norms and [to 
protect] fundamental interests from attacks by a state’s own nationals 
from abroad.”141 This rationale is clearly applicable in the context of en-
suring the observance of international human rights norms by MNCs. 
Second, it allows those countries that do not extradite their own nationals 
to ensure that offenses by those nationals do not go unprosecuted. This 
rationale assumes particular significance in the context of MNCs because 
a corporation cannot be extradited. 
Extradition is a process whereby one state will surrender a person for 
prosecution in another state. The mechanism by which defendants are 
extradited has evolved in the context of the physical transfer of an indi-
vidual and there is no precedent for the “extradition” of a corporation.142 
Although it has been suggested that “[a] corporation . . . may be made to 
answer through extradition proceedings, just as a natural person would 
be,”143 it is difficult to see how this can in fact be achieved. While a cor-
poration may commit a criminal offense in one jurisdiction even though 
it was incorporated in another,144 a corporation cannot physically move 
from one jurisdiction to another. There is therefore no way in which a 
host jurisdiction may compel the “transfer” of a corporate defendant to 
face charges in that jurisdiction. Nor is there any power by which to ex-
tradite individual officers or employees of the organization unless they 
are charged in their own right. Even if personally charged, there is no 
compulsion on them to appear as the company unless directed to by the 
company itself.145 
The host jurisdiction is therefore faced with two options. First, it may 
proceed in absentia. While ordinarily the trial of serious criminal of-
fenses requires the personal presence of the defendant,146 courts may 
proceed in absentia when, for example, the accused has absconded or is 
                                                                                                             
 141. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 448. See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). 
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ence from Home Benefits Proprietary, Ltd. v. Crafter (1939) 61 C.L.R. 701, where the 
High Court upheld a conviction against a foreign company, the issue passing sub silen-
tio). 
 145. GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 102, at 157. 
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otherwise absent.147 In some jurisdictions, specific provision is made for 
proceedings in absentia when a corporate defendant does not appear.148 
Alternatively, the corporation may submit to the jurisdiction. While 
initially it may seem unusual that a corporation would voluntarily submit 
to a criminal prosecution, it may ultimately be in the company’s interest 
to do so. For example, the company may have significant business inter-
ests in the jurisdiction, which may be jeopardized if it does not cooper-
ate. It is notable that all of the prosecutions of foreign corporations under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) appear to have been the re-
sult of guilty pleas.149  
In either case, even if the host jurisdiction were to return a verdict 
against the defendant corporation in absentia, such a verdict would only 
be enforceable against those assets of the corporation that remained in 
the jurisdiction. The enforcement of a criminal judgment beyond those 
assets would be extremely problematic and would require the coopera-
tion of the home jurisdiction. A verdict in absentia may also give rise to 
arguments of double jeopardy if another jurisdiction were to subse-
quently try the corporation. Given the practical difficulties surrounding 
extradition of corporate defendants, it is argued that the nationality prin-
ciple provides a clear justification for the prosecution of corporations for 
extraterritorial conduct. The difficulty lies in determining the nationality 
of a corporation. There are a number of determinants that may be ap-
plied, including the “siége local” (principal place of management), the 
locality of the principal shareholder, the principal place of business, or 
the place of incorporation.150 Of these, the most feasible determinants are 
principal place of business and place of incorporation. 
Principal place of business as a jurisdictional basis is well known in 
civil proceedings, and requires that the entity do business “not occasion-
ally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity” 
in the jurisdiction.151 The activities within the jurisdiction need not be 
conducted by the foreign corporation itself, but may be performed on its 
behalf by an agent.152 It therefore allows the prosecution of a corporation 
                                                                                                             
 147. R v. Jones (No. 2) (1972) 1 W.L.R. 887 (Austl.). 
 148. Crimes Act 1958, § 359(B) (1958) (Vict.). 
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irrespective of where it is incorporated, so long as its principal place of 
business was in the prosecuting country. 
While it would therefore seem to be an ideal jurisdictional basis for 
corporate prosecutions, and is used as such in the FCPA,153 this strength 
is also its weakness. The possibility that a company may have more than 
one place of business raises one of the primary concerns in relation to the 
assertion of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, which is that it may give 
rise to competing jurisdictional claims.154 Ordinarily such disputes in the 
criminal law would be resolved by the extradition process, as there is no 
criminal law equivalent of forum non conveniens. In essence, the juris-
diction that has the defendant is ultimately the one that has the ability to 
prosecute. However, this does not apply in the case of a corporate defen-
dant which, as already discussed, cannot be extradited. Consequently, 
there is the possibility that a corporate defendant could be prosecuted in 
more than one jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, for reasons of “certainty and convenience,” it is submit-
ted that place of incorporation is the most appropriate basis for determin-
ing nationality.155 In contrast to the other determinants, the place of in-
corporation is easily established. It is also fixed as each corporate entity 
can have only one place of incorporation and hence one nationality. This 
helps to avoid competing jurisdictional claims and also provides a level 
of certainty, which is essential in the context of criminal liability. Defen-
dants, whether corporate or individual, are entitled to be able to ascertain 
with some predictability their potential criminal liability. 
In applying this principle to MNCs, it must be remembered that al-
though often described as entities in their own right, MNCs are merely “a 
group of corporations, each established under the law of some state, 
linked by common managerial and financial control and pursuing inte-
grated policies.”156 A company incorporated in another jurisdiction is a 
new and distinct entity. The nationality of each constituent corporation is 
therefore determined separately and not by reference to its parent or re-
lated corporations. For example, it has been alleged that an Australian 
company, Anvil Mining Ltd., was complicit in war crimes committed by 
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo.157 The crimes, which in-
                                                                                                             
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B) (defining domestic concern). 
 154. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 465. 
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cluded summary executions, rape, and looting, were alleged to have oc-
curred near the town of Kilwa.158 After the town was seized by rebels in 
October 2004, government soldiers counter-attacked, killing at least sev-
enty three people according to a 2005 UN investigation.159 Anvil’s silver 
and copper mines are near the town, and the company’s trucks and air-
planes were used by the army during the operation.160 It was alleged that 
in failing to withdraw the vehicles, the Anvil staff members “knowingly 
facilitated (the actions of) the accused . . . when they committed the war 
crimes.”161 Anvil claimed that the vehicles were requisitioned by the 
military and that it had no choice but to hand them over.162 
In 2004, Anvil Mining underwent a corporate restructuring whereby 
the Australian company, Anvil Mining NL, was acquired by the Cana-
dian company, Anvil Mining Ltd.163 Anvil NL became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Anvil Mining Ltd., and its shares of Anvil NL were delisted 
from the Australian and Berlin Stock Exchanges.164 Anvil NL remains 
incorporated in Australia, but under the name Anvil Mining Management 
NL.165 
Applying place of incorporation as the test of nationality, Canada 
would have jurisdiction to prosecute Anvil Mining, while Australia could 
prosecute Anvil Mining Management NL. Applying the place of business 
test, Australia would have jurisdiction over Anvil Mining and Anvil 
Mining NL since, although Anvil Mining is incorporated in Canada, its 
principal place of business is in Australia.166 However, even if a case 
proceeded to judgment, the ability to enforce that judgment would be 
limited to the assets of the company within Australia. 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that in principle there is an un-
derlying doctrinal framework that would allow for the prosecution of 
corporations for complicity in human rights abuses occurring outside the 
host jurisdiction. While the imposition of such liability is theoretically 
possible, it compounds complexity upon complexity, combining three 
areas of law that have evolved primarily with individuals in mind, and 
applying them to circumstances for which they are not ideally suited. 
Even if the political will could be found to bring such a prosecution, doc-
trinal difficulties would be exacerbated by problems of gathering evi-
dence in foreign jurisdictions. Large corporations are likely to contest 
such charges vigorously. Is there any possibility of success? 
It is suggested that the best chance of a successful prosecution is to en-
act specific provisions tailored to corporate defendants and imposing ex-
traterritorial liability. A model of what may be achieved can be found in 
the FCPA, which imposes extraterritorial criminal liability with respect 
to certain practices involving the bribery of foreign officials. For the pur-
poses of illustration, this Article focuses on section 78dd-2, which ap-
plies to domestic concerns, and section 78dd-3, which applies to domes-
tic concerns and persons other than issuers.167 Under section 78dd-2(a), it 
is an offense for any domestic concern “or for any officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof 
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in further-
ance of [certain prohibited transactions relating to foreign officials].”168 It 
expressly applies to U.S. corporations, as well as organizations with their 
principal place of business in the United States.169 Jurisdiction under the 
FCPA also extends to conduct of a “United States person” acting outside 
the United States, whether or not the person “makes use of the mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.”170 Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in such cases is based on the nationality principle because 
“United States person” is defined to include corporations organized un-
der the laws of the United States.171 
The extraterritorial reach of the FCPA is further extended by section 
78dd-3(a), which makes it an offense for any person, “while in the terri-
tory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any 
                                                                                                             
 167. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994) (applies to issuers). 
 168. Id. § 78dd-2(a). 
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means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in 
furtherance of [a prohibited transaction].”172 “Person” for these purposes 
is defined to include corporations organized under the law of a foreign 
nation.173 Consequently, the United States may exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation with respect to conduct occurring primar-
ily outside the United States, so long as the corporation made use of the 
mails or the Internet in the United States.174 It does not require that the 
corporation had its principal place of business in the United States, so 
long as it had some presence in the jurisdiction.175 
Although this provision is not phrased in traditional complicity terms, 
the term “in furtherance” of is apt to encompass a broad range of conduct 
associated with the prohibited transactions. As a U.S. federal statute, 
principles of vicarious liability apply and the extraterritorial reach of the 
legislation is clear, relying expressly upon either objective territoriality 
or nationality. However, even the most well-drafted provision is mean-
ingless without the political will to prosecute and it is in this respect that 
the FCPA is perhaps most notable. 
Criminal prosecutions under the FCPA can only be brought by the U.S. 
Department of Justice176 and a summary of prosecutions under the FCPA 
reveals that the Department has pursued such prosecutions with some 
vigor.177 Prior to 1998, it appears that FCPA prosecutions primarily in-
volved U.S. corporations operating directly in foreign countries.178 How-
ever, the Act was amended in 1998 to expand its extraterritorial reach.179 
Since then, in addition to prosecutions against U.S. corporations,180 there 
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have been prosecutions successfully targeting U.S. corporations operat-
ing through subsidiaries,181 foreign corporations operating through sub-
sidiaries,182 and a foreign issuer listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.183 Of eight prosecutions brought against corporations since 1998, 
four were against foreign corporations.184 Of the new investigations 
commenced between 2005 and 2007, nineteen of the twenty-four have 
been of U.S. corporations or a combination of U.S. and foreign corpora-
tions, with five directed solely at foreign corporations.185 
In another example of corporate criminal liability for extraterritorial 
conduct, the U.S. multinational Chiquita Brands International, Inc., re-
cently pleaded guilty to engaging in prohibited transactions with a desig-
nated terrorist organization.186 Chiquita pleaded guilty to making pay-
ments via a Colombian subsidiary to the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Columbia (“AUC”).187 The payments were made in response to threats of 
harm to the company’s personnel and property, and were approved by 
senior executives who were aware that the AUC was a terrorist organiza-
tion.188 
Another useful precedent may be found in division 270 of the Austra-
lian Criminal Code Act of 1995, which creates a number of offenses re-
lating to slavery. Of particular relevance, section 270.3 provides that a 
person (including a corporation)189 who, whether within or outside Aus-
tralia, intentionally: 
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(a) possesses a slave or exercises over a slave any of the other powers 
attaching to the right of ownership; or 
(b) engages in slave trading; or 
(c) enters into any commercial transaction involving a slave; or 
(d) exercises control or direction over, or provides finance for: 
(i) any act of slave trading; or 
(ii) any commercial transaction involving a slave; 
is guilty of an offense.190 
Again, it should be noted that this offense is couched in broad terms 
and is not limited in the same way as traditional concepts such as “aiding 
and abetting.” Phrases such as “exercises control or direction over” and 
“provides finance for” are apt to cover a broad range of circumstances, 
and are particularly appropriate for corporate involvement in such of-
fenses. On the other hand, unlike complicity under the general criminal 
law, the defendant in this case is not tried as a principal offender, but is 
punished for this specific offense. The section includes language that is 
explicitly extraterritorial in operation, and principles of corporate crimi-
nal liability are found in part 2.5 of the Act. 
These are just two examples of legislative provisions that have been 
drafted in order to impose extraterritorial criminal liability on corpora-
tions. More importantly, the number of prosecutions under the FCPA 
shows just what can be achieved when the political will to enforce such 
statutes exists. 
CONCLUSION 
 [I]t is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes . . .191 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that it is possible to impose 
domestic criminal liability upon MNC’s with respect to their involve-
ment in human rights abuses outside their home jurisdiction. Such liabil-
ity is justified not only because of the difficulty of pursuing offenders in 
the host jurisdiction, but because of the culpability of the parent corpora-
tion itself. Principles of separate corporate identity cannot be allowed to 
conceal the fact that these operations are ultimately controlled by, and for 
the benefit of, the parent corporation. Parent corporations should not be 
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able to reap the benefits of distinct corporate identity yet disown their 
subsidiaries when issues of accountability arise. 
It has been demonstrated that principles of complicity may be applied 
to such conduct, that models of corporate fault exist, and that extraterri-
toriality may be justified on the basis of corporate nationality. Although 
this places the responsibility on the home jurisdiction, the situation may 
be seen as analogous to those countries that refuse to extradite their own 
nationals. Given the absence of effective international regulation and the 
inability of other countries to prosecute, it is incumbent upon the home 
jurisdiction to control the conduct of those corporations that are incorpo-
rated under its laws.192 
While such prosecutions are theoretically possible under existing 
criminal law principles, it is suggested that the complexities are such that 
the chances of a successful prosecution are slim. Far more appropriate is 
to use these underlying principles to inform the drafting of legislation 
specifically addressing corporate involvement in human rights abuses. 
Such an approach avoids the strict application of traditional accessorial 
principles in favor of provisions that reflect the reality of corporate com-
plicity. It also allows the basis of corporate fault to be clearly articulated 
and the extraterritorial reach of the laws expressly stated. Drafting spe-
cific laws also facilitates international agreement by allowing jurisdic-
tions to adapt the provisions to their own circumstances. In particular, 
some jurisdictions do not recognize corporate criminal liability at all, 
preferring instead to impose civil or administrative sanctions.193 
The merits of such an approach can be seen in the FCPA. Since its pas-
sage in 1976—a response to widespread bribery of foreign officials by 
U.S. corporations194—the United States has been instrumental in lobby-
ing for a range of international instruments prohibiting the practice.195 
Recent decades have seen a significant number of successful prosecu-
tions against both U.S. and foreign corporations with respect to conduct 
occurring outside the United States.196 While the FCPA is by no means 
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the only model, it disproves the suggestion that it is not possible to 
prosecute large corporations with respect to extraterritorial conduct. With 
appropriate legislation and political will it clearly can be done. 
Criminal prosecution of corporations under domestic law will never be 
the complete answer. It should, however, be part of an international re-
sponse. According to the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Multinational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights, states have an obligation to ensure that MNCs 
and other business enterprises respect human rights.197 While an inte-
grated response should involve a range of accountability mechanisms, it 
is the state of incorporation that has the practical ability to impose crimi-
nal sanctions on the parent corporation. Such accountability is particu-
larly important given that corporations are not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. The imposition of criminal sanctions, however, goes beyond 
the issue of accountability. It is also a mechanism through which society 
expresses its condemnation and represents an unequivocal rejection of 
that conduct. Complicity in egregious human rights abuses is not just a 
matter of doing business. The application of extraterritorial criminal laws 
is one mechanism whereby such conduct is condemned irrespective of 
where it occurs. 
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